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R v. Ahluwalia: The Vindication of Battered Women
The issue of whether provocation can serve as defence in cases of
wife battering was recently raised in London, in the case ofR v. Kiranjit
Ahluwalia.! In May 1989, Ahluwalia, who had been a victim of years of
continuous abuse and battering, poured a bucket of petrol over her
husband, Deepak Ahluwalia, while he was asleep and set him on fire.
Deepak Ahluwalia died in hospital ten days later of severe bums. Kiranjit
was charged with murder.
Kiranjit Ahluwalia was a victim of systematic violence and humiliation
during the ten years of her marriage. Her abuse consisted of being beaten
if she spoke without her husbands pennission, being hit with his belt,
having her hair tom out, her finger broken, being pushed down the stairs,
and raped. On the evening of his death he threatened her with more
brutalities.
Kiranjit had reached the 'nadir of self abasement' according to her
counsel. She had lost her self esteem and was prepared to do anything
for her husband. At one point she wrote to her husband who was
spending three days with his girlfriend that she would promise not to go
out, have friends, drink coffee or even laugh if he would consent to stay
with her.
At the original trial, the defence tried to use the argument of
provocation to reduce the charge of murder to one of manslaughter,
which carries a lesser sentence. The trial court rejected the argument that
Kiranjit was provoked into killing her husband. The court thereby refused
to expand the definition of provocation. She was prosecuted and convicted
for the murder of her husband and sentenced to life imprisonment, the
mandatory sentence laid down in the common law in England and in
India~
Her case was subsequently taken up by women's rights campaigners
and lawyers who believe that the law discriminates against women and
shows little mercy to those who have been the victims of domestic
violence. Three months ago the Court of Appeal quashed her murder
conviction and ordered a retrial of the case.
The Court of Appeal however, firmly refused to redefine the law on
provocation to take into account the experiences of battered women. Yet
in light of fresh evidence that was submitted to the Court on Kiranjit's-
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mental health at the time of the death, a retrial was ordered on the
grounds that she was suffering from diminished responsibility.
The day the new proceedings were to start, the prosecution announced
that it was prepared to accept psychiatric reports which said that Kiranjit
was suffering from mental illness which impaired her responsibility at
the time she set fire to her husband. The judge accepted the plea of
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, after hearing
her evidence about the abuse she had suffered at the hands of her husband.
The judge found that she had acted irrationally, overcome by the strain
of living with a violent man. Accordingly, he sentenced her to three
years and four months in jail, the time she had already served in jail.
Her release, after serving three years and four months for killing her
husband, represents a landmark decision. The decision not only constitutes
a recognition of the experiences of battered women and alters the criminal
law, accordingly, it also has significant implications for women in India,
whose experiences of abuse are yet to be recognised by the legislature,
let alone the courts.
The significance of the decision lies in the acceptance of women's
experience of violence in the home and lays the ground for changing the
common law position as regards the defence of provocation. It highlights
the position of battered wives who kill their husbands not in the fury of
a violent quarrel but in the aftermath of an argument. There is thus a
delay between the husband's action and the killing. This has proved
crucial to women offering provocation as a defence when charged with
murder of a violent husband who has mistreated and abused them for
years.
Women's groups and lawyers in England, argued that women who
have suffered violent treatment and abuse over a long period of time may
react with a 'slow bum' rather than a grave and sudden loss of self
control that is the classic definition of provocation which is also followed
by our courts. Traditionally, if there is a cooling off period between any
potentially provocative acts and a subsequent killing, then the defence of
provocation will fail. Yet in cases of wife abuse the delay can lead to a
boiling over which does not necessarily indicate a deliberate plotting of
retribution. A redefinition of provocation is therefore essential to take
into account the history of the marriage and the cumulative effects of
violence experienced by a woman during the course of her marriage.
The story of Kiranjit also provides justification for the recognition of
the doctrine of 'battered woman syndrome.' Such a doctrine has been
recognised by courts in Canada and the United States. There has been an
increasing acceptance by courts of expert testimony on 'battered woman
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syndrome'.2 'Battered woman syndrome' explains why a battered woman
stays in a violent relationship and does not leave; why she does not call
the police or get other assistance before killing her batterer; and why she
believed that at the time she responded, the danger she faced was
imminent, posed a threat to her life, and was therefore different and more
serious than other times when she had been beaten, had not acted and
had survived.3 The recognition of the doctrine has led to the acceptance
of a plea of self-defence which constitutes a complete defence to the
charge of murder and if accepted, leads to an acquittal. The reasonableness
standard of self-defense has been enlarged so as to recognise that women
act in self-defence in different circumstances and in different ways than men 4
In the Supreme Court of Canada case of Lavallee, a 22 year old
woman had been repeatedly abused and battered by her common law
partner during their four year relationship.5 After a quarrel, her partner
threatened to kill her. As he turned to walk out of the room, Lavallee
shot him in the back of the head. The shot killed him. Her lawyer argued
that she acted in self-defence as she reasonably believed she would be
badly injured or killed. The Court allowed the plea of self-defence which
was supported by a psychiatric assessment prepared by an expert on the
'battered woman syndrome'. The expert stated that the shooting was "the
final desperate act of a woman who believed that she would be killed
that night."
The Court stressed the importance of expert evidence on 'battered
woman syndrome' in order to destroy some of the myths surrounding the
issue of wife abuse.6 For instance, when a woman has been abused or
violated, society expects her to pack up her bags and leave. If she doesn't
move out, people believe "she was not as badly beaten as she claims or
she would have left the man long ago. Or if she was battered severely,
she must have stayed out of some masochistic enjoyment." Such myths
can adversely affect a woman's claim to have acted in self-defence. It is
for the purpose of dispelling these myths that expert evidence about
2
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'battered woman syndrome' was admitted by the Court in Lavallee.
In the Canadian case, the expert evidence was admitted to illustrate
the ways in which battered women become trapped in the abusive
relationships. The evidence further illustrated that battered wife syndrome
is characterised by the abuser begging forgiveness after the assault and
thus boosts up the victim's fragile ego and her self-esteem. Furthermore,
women try to cover up the beatings. All these factors help in appreciating
the reasonableness of the victims subjective fear in the context of such
relationships. Thus the Court underscored the importance of not judging
the situation from a standard of reasonableness derived from a male
perspective of reality. It stated clearly that trying to apply the doctrine of
self-defence from a male standard was of little use in wife assault cases.
The actions of the woman and her reasonable beliefs had to be judged
from her situation and experience, including the cumulative effect of
years of brutality.
Similarly, in the United States expert testimony has been admitted
on 'battered woman syndrome' to support a claim of self-defence in a
number of state appellate and supreme courts.? The courts have come to
recognise that the self-defense requirements of reasonableness, imminent
danger and equal force are sex biased. Judges have come to recognise
that women act in self-defense under different circumstances and in
different ways than men; that the law of self defense incorporates sex
bias; and that sex stereotypes of women as a group generally and battered
or raped women specifically, interfere with determinations of women's
claims of self-defense.
The trend of case law in other jurisdictions has significant implications
for the law in India. The decisions emphasise how the law is sex-biased
and based on male understandings and experiences of the world.
Furthermore, they can encourage battered women not to accept abuse as
part of the normal 'wear and tear' of marriage and help to create awareness
about the extent to which abuse is a pervasive social problem. Yet the
solution is not to be found in the death of batterers, but in taking the
problem of domestic violence seriously and by intervening before the
battered woman kills her partner or he kills her. Legislation on the issue
of domestic violence coupled with awareness campaigns around the issue
of violent crimes in the home are steps in this direction.
In India, the legislature has not intervened in any meaningful way to
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prevent domestic violence and wife battering, nor provide a woman with
effective relief in the event of battering. Section 498-A of the Indian
Penal Code is the only provision that comes close to recognising the
problem of domestic violence in the context of the home.8 Yet, as is
evident from the three Supreme Court cases, the provision has been used
only in dowry cases and invoked only after the woman has been killed.9
It has not served to protect the rights of the abused woman, nor to
recognise that wife battering is not confined to the context of dowry
demands and harassment.
We need to understand that women are systematically beaten in their
homes by men with whom they are close. The abuse is partly the product
of social and cultural portrayals of women as objects. Kiranjit stated that
the abuse she and other battered Asian women had suffered had caused
them to lose faith in their culture. She added that the essence of her
culture, society, and religion had reduced her and others like her to a
"plaything - stuck together and broken at will. Everybody did what they
wanted with me."
A review of Supreme Court decisions on murder reveals that most
women have been killed by men they are married to (often with the
abetment of his relations). The same is not true of murdered men. Given
these findings, the continuous defense of the institution of marriage and
the family, and the States posture of non-interference in this 'private'
domain, only serves to reinforce the guilt that keeps women in these
vicious, emotionally and physically dangerous situations. Families
continuously encourage women back into these situations of violence for
the sake of the 'honour and dignity' of the family. They are told to stay,
to do what he wants and it will get better. Yet this fails to address the
violence that men continue to inflict on women, and the fact that most of
these men are the ones who play the closest, most intimate, and potentially,
most dangerous role in our lives.
8

498-A Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty Whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects
such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisorunent for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fme.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or any person related to her to meet such demand.
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